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NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW-THE CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING:
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND UNAUTHORIZED CON
CESSIONS OF CLIENT'S GUILT

INTRODUCTION

During voir dire, Steven Abshier's court-appointed defense at
torney told the prospective jury, "Steven Abshier committed child
abuse murder and the State will prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt. We are here for sentencing and sentencing only."1 Subse
quently, the State of Oklahoma tried and sentenced Abshier to
death for first-degree murder of a child. 2
While defending Joe Elton Nixon against charges of first
degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson,3 defense counsel
told the jury during his opening statement, "In this case, there
won't be any question, none whatsoever, that my client ... caused
Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to
your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt."4 Nixon's counsel
appeared to believe that, in this trial, the jury's most important
function was not to determine his client's guilt or innocence, but to
decide whether to sentence Nixon to death or to life in prison. 5
After refusing a plea bargain that would have required him to
plead guilty to accomplice to second-degree murder, Anthony
Anaya went to trial on a charge of accomplice to first-degree mur
der.6 During the opening statement, his counsel told the jurors,
"We're not asking for an acquittal."7 During closing argument, de
fense counsel urged, "Please, please, please do as we're asking you:
1. Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579, 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 1548 (2002).
2. [d. at 587. The child in question was Abshier's twenty-two month old daugh
ter, Ashley.
3. Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. 2000).
4. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1990) (alteration in original).

5.

[d.

6.

State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142 (N.H. 1991).
[d. at 1144.

7.
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convict [Defendant] of being an accomplice to second degree mur
der. He was bad."8 Anaya's counsel did not believe that he could
credibly argue that Anaya was innocent of all charges,9 and so he
entreated the jury to impose the penalty that would have resulted
had Anaya accepted the plea-bargain. lO
At Nazzaro Scarpa's trial for drug trafficking and unlawful dis
tribution of cocaine, his attorney urged the jury to believe the testi
mony of the prosecution's witnesses (DEA agents who witnessed
the drug sales),ll and argued that Scarpa was neither a drug user
nor a drug seller, but a "mere conduit" for the cocaine.12 This argu
ment conceded the elements of the offense and "not only failed to
assist in fashioning a defense but also cemented the prosecution's
theory of the case."13 Apparently, Scarpa's defense counsel misun
derstood the charged offense, and failed to realize that persons who
knowingly serve as intermediaries in drug transactions are punisha
ble under the law. 14
As these cases illustrate, defense counsel may concede the cli
ent's guilt in a variety of contexts. The attorney may make an ex
plicit admission while addressing the jury, or guilt may be implied
more subtly, by counsel's failure to raise issues that the defendant
considers exculpatory but that may seem less than credible to de
fense counsel and the jury.IS Guilt may also be conceded by the
manner in which counsel cross-examines prosecutorial witnesses at
trial. I6 Such an admission may be the result of an inexperienced
attorney's failure to understand the elements of the offense, as in
Scarpa, or part of a well-reasoned strategy by experienced criminal
8.

Id.

9. Id. at 1143.
10. Id. at 1144.

11.

Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1994).
Id.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at 10.
15. See In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2001). In that case,
during defendant's trial for the murder of his wife and his business partner, defense
counsel "essentially chose to bargain for [Stenson'sjlife in the penalty phase by forfeit
ing his innocence in the guilt phase." Id. at 26 (Sanders, J, dissenting). On appeal of his
conviction, the defendant challenged his attorneys' failure to advance several argu
ments which Stenson considered exculpatory, most notably, counsel's refusal (in light of
convincing physical evidence implicating Stenson as the killer) to cross-examine the
wife of one of the victims in such a way as to "lay the crime at her feet." Id. at 6.
16. See State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Minn. 1984) (finding that coun
sel's cross examination of victim and her grandmother impliedly conceded that defen
dant molested the victim).
12.
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counsel aimed at appealing to a jury's mercy in sentencing, as in
Nixon and Anaya.
The critical issue in such cases is the extent to which a defense
attorney's decision, expressly or impliedly, to admit a client's guilt is
a tactical choice within the attorney's discretion, or whether the
right to make such a decision is inextricably linked with a defen- .
dant's constitutional rights such that an unauthorized admission of
guilt by one's attorney may give rise to a claim of ineffective assis
tance of counsel and may justify a new trial.
This Note explores the tension between defense attorneys' lati
tude in choosing trial strategy and criminal defendants' constitu
tional rights in determining whether and by what means to mount a
defense at trial. Part I describes the development of the effective
assistance of counsel doctrine and current standards for evaluating
the merit of effective assistance of counsel claims. Part II evaluates
several principal cases that develop the polar positions in the
courts' struggle to determine the proper judicial response when de
fense counsel makes an unauthorized admission of guilt. Finally,
Part III argues that existing notions of the collaborative nature of
the attorney client relationship, constitutional protections sur
rounding the entrance of guilty pleas, and public policy considera
tions all establish the need for a clear rule that an attorney may not
concede guilt without the defendant's consent.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE STANDARDS OF
ApPELLATE REVIEW OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecu
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." For the past seventy years, the right to
counsel has been interpreted as the right to effective assistance of
counsel. 17
Historically, a variety of standards have been applied to assess
whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel. At
one time, the standard most frequently employed asked whether
counsel's performance made the trial a "farce and mockery of jus
17. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been
recognized that the right of counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.");
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that counsel must not be appointed
"under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case").
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tice."18 Gradually, the "farce and mockery" standard gave way to
an analysis of whether the lawyer's conduct equaled that of a "rea
sonably competent attorney."19
The Supreme Court did not provide guidance for assessing ef
fective assistance of counsel challenges until 1984, when it decided
. Strickland v. Washington 20 and United States v. Cronic. 21 Both
cases provide a different standard for evaluating effective assistance
claims,22 and there is much disagreement among lower courts as to
which standard should be applied to ineffective assistance claims
stemming from defense counsel's unauthorized admission of guilt.
This Note will examine both standards and address the different
interpretations by the lower courts.
A.

The General Rule: Strickland v. Washington

In Strickland v. Washington,23 a habeas corpus case wherein
the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel arising from
his defense attorney's failure to defend him adequately during the
sentencing phase of his capital murder trial,24 the Court established
a two-prong test for determining whether counsel's assistance falls
below the constitutional standard for effectiveness. To prevail on a
Sixth Amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate, first, that
the attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of rea
sonableness,"25 and second, that "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro
ceeding would have been different. "26 The defendant is entitled to
18. See United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that "[a]
lack of effective assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience
of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice"); see also Bot
tiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Cofield v. United
States, 263 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 360 U.S.
472 (1959).
19. See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that "the time has come to declare that 'effective' assistance means 'reasonably compe
tent assistance,' which we regard as a shorthand for the standard that the quality of a
defense counsel's representation should be within the range of competence reasonably
expected of attorneys in criminal cases"); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th
Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976).
20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
22. See discussion infra Parts LA, LB.
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24. Id. at 675.
25. Id. at 688.
26. ld. at 694.
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a new trial only upon satisfaction of both elements. 27
The second prong of the Strickland standard is commonly
known as the prejudice requirement: it requires that the defendant
demonstrate not only that counsel erred, but that his case was
prejudiced as a result. The Court defined a reasonable probability
as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome
[of the proceeding]."28 The Court established the reasonable
probability standard as a middle ground between a lax standard
that would merely require the defendant to demonstrate that coun
sel's errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding,"29 and a stringent standard that would require the de
fendant to prove "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than
not altered the outcome in the case."30 In determining whether
there is a reasonable probability of prejudice, a court reviewing an
ineffectiveness claim must evaluate the case record in order to
"consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury."31
Although a "reasonable probability" of prejudice is by no
means a precise standard, it is the first prong of the Strickland test,
reasonableness of counsel's representation, that engenders debate
in ineffectiveness claims arising out of unauthorized concessions of
guilt by counsel. Courts disagree whether an unauthorized admis
sion of guilt can ever be a reasonable trial strategy.32
In defining the reasonableness standard of the first prong of
the Strickland test, the Supreme Court endorsed the "reasonably
effective assistance" standard that, by 1984, had been adopted by all
the federal circuit courts and most state courtS.33 The Court de
clined to delineate a more specific measure of attorney competence
than the objective standard of reasonableness,34 observing that
"any ... set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally pro
tected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude coun
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 700.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 695.
See discussion and principal cases infra Part II.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 688. The majority stated, "More specific guidelines are not appropriate.

The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular requirements
of effective assistance .... The proper measure of attorney performance remains sim
ply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. Justice Brennan wrote
that "[w]ith respect to the performance standard, I agree with the Court's conclusion
that a 'particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct' would be inappropriate."
Id. at 703 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 688).
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sel must have in making tactical decisions. "35
Under the Strickland analysis, "fj]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential. "36 In evaluating ineffec
tive assistance claims, courts "must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro
fessional assistance. "37 The reasonableness prong requires the de
fendant to overcome the "presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound
trial strategy."'38
Legal scholars tend to view the Court's deference to attorney
strategy and its unwillingness to articulate specific standards of at
torney conduct with favor. 39 Because there are myriad ways to pro
vide effective assistance of counsel in any given case,40 courts have
expressed fear that specific guidelines promulgated by the Supreme
Court would deter defense counsel from providing innovative and
vigorous advocacy.41
However, in his vigorous dissent to Strickland, Justice Marshall
criticized the Court's deferential stance with respect to attorney
performance:
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court
is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no
grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which
the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different
35. Id. at 689.
36. Id.
37. Id. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at
the time." Id.
38. Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955».
39. See, e.g., Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9,86 (1986) (stating that "at this
stage of development of the law on ineffective assistance, the difficulty of articulating a
comprehensive list of duties justifies the Court's reluctance to constitutionalize any spe
cific directives to counsel").
40. For a discussion of the different variables that a criminal defense attorney has
to measure, see, for example, Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 343 (1983).
41. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. See also State v. Piche, 430 P.2d 522, 526
(Wash. 1967).
To assure the defendant of counsel's best efforts ... the law must afford the
attorney a wide latitude and flexibility in his choice of trial psychology and
tactics. If counsel is to be stultified at trial by a post trial scrutiny of the myr
iad choices he must make in the course of a trial ... he will lose the very
freedom of action so essential to a skillful representation of the accused.
Id.
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courts. To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a
criminal defendant must behave "reasonably" and must act like
"a reasonably competent attorney" ... is to tell them almost
nothing. In essence, the majority has instructed judges called
upon to assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to ad
vert to their own intuitions regarding what constitutes "profes
sional" representation, and has discouraged them from trying to
develop more detailed standards governing the performance of
defense counsel. In my view, the Court has thereby not only ab
dicated its own responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but
also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs.42
In the years since the Strickland standard was announced,
these words have proven prophetic, at least with respect to ineffec
tive assistance claims arising out of unauthorized concessions of
guilt by defense counsel. While courts seem to recognize that the
vast majority of ineffective assistance claims must be evaluated ac
cording to the two prongs of the Strickland test-unreasonably de
ficient performance and prejudice-there is widespread
disagreement among the courts about how to evaluate a situation
where the defense attorney admits guilt without the client's
consent.
In such a situation, the Strickland analysis appears not to fit,
because that test is tailored to claims of "actual ineffectiveness" of
counsel's assistance. 43 A claim of ineffectiveness generally chal
lenges counsel's preparation (i.e., whether counsel adequately in
vestigated, researched, interviewed witnesses, filed motions, et
cetera) or performance at trial (i.e., whether counsel cross-ex
amined witnesses, presented mitigating evidence, made a closing
statement).44 Other claims challenge grossly unprofessional con
duct such as being intoxicated,45 using drugs,46 or sleeping through
Strickland, 466 u.s. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 683.
44. For compilations of ineffective assistance claims, see generally JOHN M.
BURKOFF & HOPE HUDSON, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1-3 (1994); LARRY
FASSLER, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (1993). See also Gary Goodpaster,
The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal
Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986); Barbara R. Levine, Preventing
Defense Counsel Error-An Analysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
and Their Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. ToL. L. REV. 1275 (1984).
45. See, e.g., Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
although defendant alleged that counsel had been intoxicated during trial and counsel
entered an alcohol treatment program after trial, there were no specific instances of
deficient conduct by counsel); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (rul
42.
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tria1. 47 Some claims simply allege ineffective assistance because
counsel did not have adequate experience in criminal trials or did
not have sufficient time to prepare a case. 48
Contrast with these cases the ineffective assistance claim raised
in Nixon v. Singletary.49 In that case, defense counsel was an exper
ienced attorney whose strategy, in admitting the defendant's guilt,
was praised by the trial judge as being the defendant's best hope of
avoiding the death penalty.50 The reasonableness of counsel's strat
egy in this situation would likely have been beyond reproach-if
the defendant had consented to the tactic. He did not,51 and the
Strickland analysis of reasonable performance and prejudice ap
pears inadequate to address the issue of whether his attorney's ad
mission-though well-intentioned and an objectively good
strategy-nevertheless violated the defendant's constitutional
rights.
When faced with a scenario like that raised in Nixon, courts
struggle with whether to apply the Strickland analysis or one of the
ing that although defense counsel admitted being an alcoholic and suffering blackouts
during trial, there was no evidence that it affected his representation of defendant).
46. See, e.g., Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that
even though counsel had an admitted drug problem, there was no showing of ineffective
assistance ).
47. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (af
firming district court holding that "sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at all"),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833-34 (9th Cir.
1984) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel slept through substantial portions of
the trial); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding
no ineffective assistance where counsel slept through parts of trial, and opining that co
counsel may have let the attorney sleep as a strategic choice aimed at gaining jurors'
sympathy for defendant), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d
249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 663-66 (1984) (alleging inef
fective assistance where defense attorney had no previous experience with jury trials or
criminal law and had twenty-five days to prepare a case that took the government four
and one-half years to investigate); Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that counsel was not ineffective even though appointed the morning of trial).
49. 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000). See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.B.
50. [d. at 630 (Wells, J., dissenting). Justice Wells quoted a statement by the trial
judge lauding the defense attorney's methods:
It is my view that the tactic employed by trial counsel in this case was an
excellent analysis of [the] reality of his case and the preservation of his credi
bility.... A less experienced attorney, probably seeking to avoid criticism ...
would have tried the case differently, and probably would have left no hope at
all for Mr. Nixon.
Id.
51. Nixon was disruptive and uncooperative at trial. Id. at 625. He refused to
attend the majority of the trial and was not present when his attorney made the state
ments that formed the basis of his appeal. Id. at 620 n.3.
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three recognized exceptions to that standard. 52 The most common
exception is the "surrounding circumstances" standard articulated
in United States v. Cronic,53 decided by the Supreme Court on the
same day as Strickland.
B.

The "Surrounding Circumstances" Exception: United States
v. Cronic and Meaningful Adversarial Testing

Where the Strickland standard evaluates the reasonableness
and the prejudicial effect of specific counsel errors, the Cronic stan
dard looks to the adequacy of counsel's overall performance in the
context of the surrounding circumstances of the case. 54 The Cronic
standard applies to a limited category of cases "in which the sur
rounding circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could
provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly pre
sumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial."55 The
Court identified three trial situations that implicate Cronic analy
sis. 56 The first and "[m]ost obvious" situation is the "complete de
nial of counsel" during a critical stage of the proceeding.57 The
52. Each of the three exceptions to the Strickland test presumes prejudice rather
than requiring the defendant to demonstrate that, but for counsel's admission, he or she
would not have been convicted. In addition to the "surrounding circumstances" excep
tion discussed, infra Part I.B, the Supreme Court articulated a conflict of interest excep
tion in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Under this test, the defendant must
demonstrate (1) that his attorney "actively represented conflicting interests" and (2)
that the "actual conflict of interest affected his lawyer's performance." Id. at 350.
The third exception to Strickland is the "irreconcilable conflict" standard recog
nized by the Ninth Circuit. This standard applies specifically to the situation where a
conflict develops between counsel and the defendant such that "the relationship be
tween lawyer and client completely collapses." In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16
P.3d 1, 9 (Wash. 2001) (citing United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.
1998».
For more information on the "irreconcilable conflict" standard, see, for example,
Moore, 159 F.3d at 1154 (finding per se prejudice where motion to substitute counsel
was denied after defendant threatened to sue counsel for malpractice and counsel effec
tively stopped working on defendant's defense); United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d
1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) (presuming prejudice where attorney-client relationship was
a "stormy one with quarrels, bad language, threats, and counter-threats"); Brown v.
Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970) (presuming prejudice where defendant went to
trial with attorney with whom he would not cooperate or communicate, because the
court found that defense was perfunctory, and that it would not be unreasonable to
believe that, had defendant been represented by an attorney with whom he had a better
relationship, he would have been convicted of a lesser offense).
53. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
54. See id. at 666 n.41.
55. Id. at 66l.
56. Id. at 658-59. See also Bell v. Cone, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850-51 (2002).
57. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.

324

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:315

Court has used the phrase "critical stage"58 to "denote a step of a
criminal proceeding ... that [holds] significant consequences for the
accused."59 The absence of counsel at a critical stage of the trial
may be actual or constructive. 60
Second, a trial is presumptively unfair under Cronic "if counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adver
sarial testing."61 In Bell v. Cone,62 the Supreme Court clarified this
statement by concluding, "When we spoke in Cronic of the possibil
ity of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the
prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be
complete."63
Finally, "where counsel is called upon to render assistance
under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could
not,"64 the Cronic standard applies. As an example of such a case,
the Court cited Powell v. Alabama,65 a highly publicized capital
rape trial in which the trial judge appointed "all the members of the
bar" to represent the defendants rather than appointing a single at
torney.66 The Court held that this designation of counsel "was ei
58. Id.
59. Bell, 122 S. Ct. at 1851 n.3 and accompanying text. Whether a proceeding is a
"critical stage" depends upon an analysis of "whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights inheres in the ... confrontation and the ability of counsel to help
avoid that prejudice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). The Supreme
Court has identified a number of "critical stages" throughout a criminal proceeding.
See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1250 (2002) (appointment of counsel to
indigent defendants and the opportunity for pretrial consultation with counsel); Michi
gan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (interrogation after the defendant asserts the
right to counsel); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470-71 (1981) (pretrial psychiatric ex
aminations); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) (closing argument); Cole
man v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (preliminary hearing to fix bail); Wade, 388
U.S. at 227 (pretrial identification lineup); Mempa v. Rbay, 389 U.S. 128, 129 (1967)
(sentencing); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (jury selection), overruled on
other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59, 60 (1963) (preliminary hearing to enter plea); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961) (arraignment).
60. Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 1994) (Beezer, J.,
concurring).
61. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
62. 122 S. Ct. 1843 (2002).
63. Id. at 1851 (emphasis added).
64. Bell, 122 S. Ct. at 1851 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-62).
65. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
66. In Powell, three black defendants were charged with the highly publicized
rape of two white women. Id. at 49. The trial judge appointed "all the members of the
bar" to arraign them, but on the morning of trial, the only attorney to appear for the
defense was a lawyer from Tennessee, who had not had time to prepare for the case or
to familiarize himself with Alabama procedure, and therefore stated he was unwilling to
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ther so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial
of effective and substantial aid in that regard."67
The Cronic exception reflects the Supreme Court's recognition
that the underlying purpose of the Constitution's guarantee of ef
fective assistance of counsel is to ensure truth and fairness through
adversarial testing. 68 Partisan advocacy on both sides of a case is
the "very premise" of our criminal justice system. 69 That premise
"underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment. It is meant
to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process."70 Thus, the
purpose of the Cronic standard is to evaluate whether counsel's
performance "require[ d] the prosecution's case to survive the cruci
ble of meaningful adversarial testing."71 If the reviewing court ex
amines the trial record and determines that counsel's performance
did not meet this standard, prejudice is presumed,n and the defen
dant is granted a new trial.
C.

Debating the Scope of the Cronic Exception

There is debate over how narrowly to limit the category of
cases to which the Cronic standard should appropriately be applied.
Several courts apply Cronic review when defense counsel concedes
guilt or absence of reasonable doubt without the defendant's con
sent, on the theory that to do so "entirely fails to subject the prose
cution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."73
represent the defendants. Id. at 56-57. The attorney was appointed anyway, to be pro
vided with voluntary assistance from the local bar, and trial proceeded without delay.
Id. at 57.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655-56.
69. Id. at 655.
70. Id. at 655-56 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981».
71. Id. at 656.
72. Prejudice is presumed because failure to submit the prosecution's charges to
adversarial testing is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assis
tance of counsel. "When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted-even if
defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors-the kind of testing envisioned by
the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confron
tation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated." Id. at 656-57.
73. See United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659) (applying Cronic review where defense counsel conceded, dur
ing closing argument, that no reasonable doubt existed regarding the only factual issues
in dispute); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (presuming prejudice where
counsel admitted defendant's guilt in an attempt to persuade the jury not to sentence
his client to death); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1147 (N.H. 1991) (fmding prejudice
per se where counsel urged the jury to convict his client of a lesser-included offense,
even though his client had refused to plea to that offense and had testified to his com
plete innocence); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. 1985) (holding that
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The above approach, however, has vocal detractors who be
lieve that the Cronic test should be applied to an extremely narrow
category of cases. In Scarpa v. Dubois ,74 the First Circuit criticized
what it considered a trend toward overextending the Cronic
exception:
A few courts have extended the exception's boundaries be
yond the circumstances surrounding representation and found
that a lawyer's particular errors at trial may cause a breakdown
in the adversarial system and thus justify invocation of the Cronic
dictum. We believe that these cases misperceive the rationale
underlying the Cronic exception. In our view, the Court's lan
guage in Cronic was driven by the recognition that certain types
of conduct are in general so antithetic to effective assistance-for
example, lawyers who leave the courtroom for long stretches of
time during trial are unlikely to be stellar advocates in any mat
ter-that a case-by-case analysis simply is not worth the cost of
protracted litigation. No matter what the facts of a given case
may be, this sort of conduct will almost always result in prejudice.
But attorney errors particular to the facts of an individual case
are qualitatively different. Virtually by definition, such errors
"cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing
prejudice" or "defined with sufficient precision to inform defense
attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid." Consequently,
the Court has declined to accord presumptively prejudicial status
to them.7 5

The Scarpa court predicted that overextending the Cronic ex
ception would requite an inquiry into the facts of individual cases,
thus requiring litigation to determine initially whether the Cronic
test applies 76 and defeating the purpose of the exception, which is
to presume prejudice where the attorney's ineffectiveness is so pa
tently egregious that litigation to establish it is unnecessary.77
"when counsel to the surprise of his client admits his client's gUilt, the harm is so likely
and so apparent that the issue of prejudice need not be addressed").
74. 38 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
76. /d. at 14.
77. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 (1984) (holding that prejudice
should only be presumed in cases where "the surrounding circumstances made it so
unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that ineffectiveness [is] prop
erly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial"). The Court recognized
that while the burden of demonstrating a constitutional violation in counsel's perform
ance generally rests on the accused, there are "circumstances that are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjusti
fied." Id. at 658.
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PRINCIPAL CASES

This Part presents the development of a circuit split regarding
the scope of the Cronic exception. Section A introduces the federal
circuit cases that best articulate the polar positions in interpreting
Cronic's per se prejudice standard. Section B explores how the de
bate has been expanded in state courts and examines the two most
common scenarios that give rise to a defense attorney's tactical de
cision to admit the defendant's guilt. Finally, Section C evaluates a
case in which the two-prong Strickland analysis remains the appro
priate standard despite defense counsel's concession of guilt.
A.

The Federal Circuit Split: United States v. Swanson and
Scarpa v. Dubois
1.

Cronic Broadly Interpreted: United States v. Swanson 78

In February 1989, Brent Paul Swanson was indicted on one
count of bank robbery,19 Swanson initially pleaded guilty, but with
drew his plea after learning that he would be sentenced as a career
offender. 80 At trial, Swanson's court-appointed counsel rested after
the prosecution's case in chief, without calling any witnesses. 81
During closing argument, Swanson's attorney asserted that a
defense attorney's "job" was to raise reasonable doubt. 82 Never
theless, the attorney went on to make several statements to the ef
fect that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution's witnesses
did not "[come] to the level ofraising reasonable doubt."83 He told
the jury that the evidence against his client was "overwhelming,"84
and concluded his closing argument by saying, "And if {Swanson] is
proven guilty, don't hesitate in saying so and when you go home to
night don't ever look back and say 'Did I do the right thing?' If your
conscience dictates that that was the right thing to do, you have
done your part."85
Following Swanson's conviction, his case came before the
Ninth Circuit in a habeas corpus proceeding alleging ineffective as
sistance of counsel because his attorney conceded in his closing ar
78.

943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 1071.
80. Id.
81. [d.
82. Id. at 1077. The full text of defense counsel's closing argument is attached as
an appendix to the Swanson opinion. Id. at 1076-78.
83. Id.
84. [d.
85. [d. at 1078.
79.
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gument "that there was no reasonable doubt regarding the only
factual issues in dispute."86 The Ninth Circuit, though recognizing
that the prejudice standard established in Strickland is the general
test of ineffective assistance of counsel claims,87 decided that the
circumstances of Swanson justified application of the Cronic
exception. 88
The Ninth Circuit held that Swanson's defense counsel's con
duct "caused a breakdown in our adversarial system"89 for several
reasons. First, defense counsel's statements lessened the govern
ment's burden of proof9o and "tainted the integrity of the trial."91
Second, the court held that "[t]he concession that there was no rea
sonable doubt ... was an abandonment of the defense of his client
at a critical stage92 of the proceedings. "93
The court commented, "We cannot envision a situation more
damaging to an accused than to have his own attorney tell the jury
that there is no reasonable doubt that his client was the person who
committed the conduct that constituted the crime charged in the
indictment."94 Indeed, the court so strongly believed that Swan
son's counsel's conduct was indefensible that it directed its clerk to
provide the State Bar of Arizona with a copy of the Swanson opin
ion so that the attorney involved would be sanctioned for
negligence. 95

2.

Cronic Narrowly Interpreted: Scarpa v. Dubois 96

During the summer of 1987, a Boston-based DEA agent posing
as a cocaine purchaser met several times with his initial target, Rob
86. [d. at 1072.
87. Id.
88. [d. at 1074 (holding that defense counsel's conduct "caused a breakdown in
our adversarial system of justice in this case that compels an application of the Cronic
exception to the Strickland requirement of a showing that the outcome of the trial
would have been different without counsel's errors or omissions") (citing Cronic, 466
U.S. at 659-60).
89. Id.
90. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1075 (stating that, "[b]y arguing that no reasonable
doubt existed regarding the only factual issues in dispute, [defense counsel] shouldered
part of the Government's burden of persuasion").
91. [d. at 1074.
92. See supra note 59 for a discussion of what constitutes a "critical stage."
93. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1074 (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)
(holding that closing argument is a "critical stage"».
94. [d. at 1075.
95. [d. at 1076.
96. 38 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
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ert Ricupero. 97 Petitioner Nazzaro Scarpa accompanied Ricupero
to these meetings. 98 At the first meeting, Scarpa handed drugs to
Ricupero, who handed them to the DEA agent. 99 The agent then
gave Ricupero $1,500 in cash, which Ricupero, after taking a $100
share for himself, gave to Scarpa. IOO At the second meeting, Scarpa
and Ricupero were joined by James Marcella, who handed a pack
age containing cocaine to Scarpa, who passed it to Ricupero, who in
turn gave it to the agent: the money then passed from the agent, to
Ricupero, to Scarpa, and lastly back to Marcella.101
Following these transactions, the Commonwealth of Massachu
setts indicted Scarpa for drug trafficking and unlawful distribu
tion.1°2 He was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
After exhausting his state law claims,103 he filed an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.1°4 The district court
applied the Cronic analysis and granted the petition, finding that
"defense counsel's performance not only fell below an objectively
reasonable standard of proficiency but also caused a breakdown in
the adversarial system. This ... constituted prejUdice per se."105
Pursuant to these findings, the district court vacated the conviction
and ordered Scarpa released from state custody.106
The.district court noted several misgivings about defense coun
sel's performance. While the prosecution presented its case prima
rily through two witnesses, a DEA agent and a Boston police
detective,l07 defense counsel cross-examined only the DEA agent,
did not attempt to impeach him, and did not call witnesses in
Scarpa's defense.108 Instead, his closing argument urged the jury to
accept the government's testimony as truth.109 Counsel said III
closing:
What happened to that money? What was its final destin a
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Commonwealth v. Scarpa, 571 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1991), affg 567 N.E.2d
1268 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
104. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 5.
105. Id.
106. Id. At the time of argument before the First Circuit, Scarpa was not
incarcerated.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id.
109. [d.
97.
98.
99.
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tion? Is Scarpa a user of drugs? Is Scarpa someone that
Ricupero, the target of the investigation-is Scarpa-was he
used by Ricupero to shield himself? . . . And I'm suggesting to
you-again, at the expense of being repetitious, Scarpa is not
found-and it is undetermined-that is the word that Agent
Desmond used on July 8th-it's undetermined if Scarpa had any
of that money .... And clearly, the source of the cocaine on the
8th was not Scarpa. At best he was a conduit; someone through
whom it passed, and through whom the money passed. 110

Although the First Circuit agreed with the district court's find
ing that the defense counse1's argument "effectively conceded the
only disputed elements of the ... crimes and relieved the prosecu
tion of its burden of proof,"111 and that counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable, the court nevertheless reversed the judg
ment because the district court reacheo its decision by inappropri
ately applying the Cronic test rather than Strickland analysis. llz
The First Circuit had several justifications for its decision not
to apply the Cronic exception to Scarpa's counse1's errors,1l3 but
one of the court's reasons bears further discussion. The First Cir
cuit cited recent Supreme Court cases that held that "trial errors"114
110. Id. at 10.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 13-15. Those reasons not discussed in the text are: the court's belief
that the Supreme Court did not intend Cronic to be broadly expanded, id. at 14; the
court's fear that broad application of Cronic would "replace case-by-case litigation over
prejudice with case-by-case litigation over prejudice per se," id.; and the court's desire
to protect the State's interest in the finality of jury verdicts and the related goal of
avoiding the loss of time and resources required to retry cases, id. at 15.
114. A trial error occurs "during the presentation of the case to the [trier of fact],
and which may therefore be qualitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasona
ble doubt." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,307-08 (1991). See Clemons v. Mis
sissippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990) (overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage
of a capital case); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (jury instruction con
taining an erroneous conclusive presumption); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258
60 (1988) (admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case violated de
fendant's Sixth Amendment rights); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-504 (1987) (jury
instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 584
(1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption); Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of defendant's testimony re
garding the circumstances of his confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
684 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's right to cross-examine a witness for bias in
violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.
114,117-118, & n.2 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at
trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. Evans,
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are properly analyzed by harmless-error standards, which require
the defendant to demonstrate prejudice, while "structural errors"
defy harmless-error analysisPS Structural errors are fundamental
errors that disturb the framework of the trial 116 and thus necessitate
"automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire
trial piocess."117 Structural errors include the total deprivation of
the right to counsel,118 failure to give a sufficient "reasonable
doubt" instruction,119 and race-based discrimination in jury selec
tion.no Trial errors come in far more varieties,121 but "all such er
rors occur 'during the presentation of the case to the jury,' and
therefore may 'be quantitatively assessed in the context of [the] evi
dence presented' in order to gauge harmlessness."122
The First Circuit held that Scarpa's attorney's conduct was
analogous to a trial error123 because, "[l]ike the line separating trial
errors from structural errors, the line past which prejudice will be
presumed in cases involving claims of ineffective assistance ought to
be plotted to exclude cases in which a detailed contextual analysis is
required."124 Put another way, the court seems to suggest that in
cases where a review of the trial record enables the court to weigh
the severity of defense counsel's errors-in this case, concession of
reasonable doubt-against the overall fairness of the trial, it would
not be judicially advisable to presume prejudice.
The First Circuit analyzed Scarpa's counsel's errors in the con
text of the whole record, including the facts of the case, the tran
456 u.s. 605 (1982) (statute improperly forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction
on a lesser-included offense in a capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause);
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the presump
tion of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (unconstitutional admis
sion of identification evidence); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)
(admission of the out-of-court statement of a non testifying codefendant); Milton v.
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (confession obtained in violation of Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (admis
sion of illegally obtained evidence); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (de
nial of counsel at a preliminary bail hearing).
115. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38
(1993), and Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-08 (1991)).
116. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14.
117. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30.
118. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
119. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
120. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-62 (1986) (grand jury); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (petit jury).
121. See supra note 114.
122. Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 14 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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script of proceedings, exhibits, and applicable substantive law. 125
The court held "that Strickland controls inquiries concerning coun
sel's actual performance at trial, and that substandard performance,
in the nature of particular attorney errors, cannot conclusively be
presumed to have been prejudicial."126
Under Strickland analysis, Scarpa's failure to demonstrate
prejudice was fatal to his case. 127 The First Circuit cited several
reasons why prejudice had not been demonstrated in this case: the
one-sidedness of the evidence in the prosecution's favor,128 the fact
that defense counsel's "conduit" argument conceded only facts that
were "overwhelmingly supported" by the government's evi
dence,129 and Scarpa's ongoing failure to "identify any promising
line of defense. "130
Although the First Circuit's narrow interpretation of Cronic
led it to apply the Strickland standard in Scarpa, the court did not
entirely disregard the more expansive Cronic interpretation. In a
footnote, the court stated that "[e]ven if one were to accept the
expansive view of Cronic . .. the record here simply does not justify
a finding of a complete failure to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing."131 The court then catalogued the
few positive aspects of the defense attorney's representation,132 and
concluded that the record did not demonstrate "such a deliberate
rolling over as might warrant a finding of an absolute breakdown of
the adversarial process. "133
Finally, one fact-determinative difference sets Scarpa apart
from cases applying the broadly interpreted Cronic exception:
Scarpa's attorney never expressly admitted his client's guilt. Per
haps conceding reasonable doubt through a theory of defense that
is ignorant of the substantive law is not as "deliberate [a] rolling
over"134 as an outright admission of culpability.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 15 n.8.
132. Specifically, defense counsel focused his closing argument on the govern
ment's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; he informed the jury that they
could choose whether or not to believe witness testimony, and he urged the jurors that,
in deciding the case, they must "have an abiding conviction." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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The Expanding Debate in the State Courts
1.

Admitting Guilt to Lesser-Included Offenses: State v.
Anaya 135

When representing defendants charged with serious offenses,
attorneys sometimes tell the jury that the client is guilty of lesser
included offenses in an attempt to prevent conviction on more seri
ous charges. 136 Courts are divided about whether to view the attor
ney's conduct as constitutionally ineffective assistance or
reasonable trial strategy.137
In State v. Anaya, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied
the Cronic standard to overturn the defendant's accomplice to sec
ond-degree murder charge without finding prejudice. Anaya's trial
counsel's closing argument contained at least five requests for his
conviction as an accomplice to second-degree murder, and for his
acquittal on the charge of accomplice to first-degree murder.138
Defense counsel pursued this strategy even though Anaya had re
jected a negotiated plea on the second-degree charge and had taken
the stand at trial to testify that he was "completely innocent."139
Anaya's well-documented refusal to consent to counsel's strat
egy140 was the dispositive factor in the court's decision to overturn
his conviction. Although the court recognized that other courts
faced with the situation where the attorney admits the client's guilt
to a lesser-included offense generally "view the attorney's conduct
as a sound strategical move made in the face of overwhelming evi
dence of the defendant's guilt,"141 the court distinguished such
cases 142 on two grounds. First, those other defendants had not testi
fied to their complete innocence, as Anaya had,143 and second, they
135. 592 A.2d 1142 (N.H. 1991).
136. See id; see also Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane,
298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.
1984); Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1987); People v. Siverly, 551 N.E.2d 1040
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990), and Alexander v. State, 782 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
137. See Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1145-46.
138. Id. at 1144.
139. Id.
140. In addition to testifying to his own innocence, "Anaya became so agitated
during his attorney's closing argument" that co-counsel had to restrain him. Id.
141. Id. at 1145.
142. The cases distinguished by the court were McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d
674 (11th Cir. 1984); People v. Siverly, 551 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Alexander
v. State, 782 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); and Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295 (Miss.
1987). C/. Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane, 298 F.3d 375 (5th
Cir. 2002).
143. Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1146.
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had not rejected an opportunity to plead to the lesser offense urged
upon the jury by counsel. 144
Notably, the Anaya court did not hold that defense counsel
must obtain the defendant's consent before pursuing a strategy that
concedes guilt to a lesser offense, although some courts have. 145 In
stead, the court held only that counsel may not pursue such a strat
egy over the defendant's objection. 146
Although the Anaya court applied the Cronic exception and
did not require the defendant to prove prejudice, the decision is still
troublesome. A defendant has a constitutional right not to tes
tify,147 so making a defendant's testimony as to his innocence a de
terminative factor in evaluating the validity of an ineffective
assistance claim is problematic. Securing one's constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel should not be conditioned upon
surrendering another constitutionally protected privilege. Like
wise, the second factor considered by the Anaya court, the rejected
plea-bargain, should not determine the success of the ineffective as
sistance claim because the availability of a plea offer-and the op
portunity to reject it-is completely outside the defendant's
control. Instead, the only determinative factor should be whether
or not the defendant consented to his attorney's strategy, and the
defendant should be given an opportunity to express that consent
on the record before the attorney concedes guilt-rather than re
quiring the defendant to object to the strategy once the damage has
been done.
2.

Appealing to the Jury's Mercy: Admitting Guilt in
Capital Crimes

In capital cases, as in cases with lesser-included offenses, inef
fective assistance of counsel claims may arise out of a defense attor
ney's unauthorized admission of the defendant's guilt.1 48 Because
144. Id.
145. See State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507 (N.C. 1985); State v. House, 456
S.E.2d 292, 297 (N.C. 1995). For further discussion on the need to make a record of the
defendant's consent to an admission of guilt, see discussion infra Part III.B.
146. Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1146.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
148. See Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Johnson, 131
F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1997); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); People v.
Lucas, 907 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1995); People v. Cain, 892 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1995); Nixon v.
Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000); Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App.
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capital trials are bifurcated into guilt and penalty phases,149 defense
attorneys may consider the defendant's guilt a fairly minor issue
even a non-issue-compared to the goal of avoiding a death sen
tence in the penalty phase.150
Most courts faced with this issue have held that admissions of
guilt by counsel are reasonable in the context of a death penalty
defense.1 51 In Abshier v. State,152 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held:
In some circumstances ... where the defendant has con
fessed and the evidence is overwhelming, it could be reasonable
trial strategy to candidly concede guilt early in the trial in order
to establish credibility with the jury in the hope that at least one
juror can be persuaded to vote for a sentence less than death in
the penalty stage. 153

The reasoning behind the Abshier decision, and those like it,
seems to be that defense counsel should be allowed, as a matter of
trial strategy, to admit what he knows the government can prove in
order to maintain credibility with the jury for the "critical" penalty
phase. 154 If there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, counse1's ad
missions cannot prejudice the defendant's case.1 55
However, this argument assumes that the penalty phase is
more "critical" than the guilt phase. Nevertheless, some defendants
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1548 (2002); in re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1
(Wash. 2001).
149. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly required bifurcated trials
in death penalty cases, the states have interpreted the Court's remarks condoning bifur
cation as "virtually requiring it." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr.
REV. 305,309. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("As a general proposition, these concerns [ex
pressed in Furman regarding the arbitrary and capricious administration of capital pun
ishment] are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding ....")
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972».
150. See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1991) (defense counsel stated
in opening statement, "This case is about the death of Joe Elton Nixon and whether it
should occur within the next few years by electrocution or maybe its natural expiration
after a lifetime of confinement"); Abshier, 28 P.3d at 593 ("We are here for sentencing
and sentencing only ....").
151. See, e.g., Kitchens, 190 F.3d at 704; Carter, 131 F.3d at 466; Lucas, 907 P.2d
at 392; Cain, 892 P.2d at 1241; Abshier, 28 P.3d at 594.
152. 28 P.3d 579.
153. Id. at 594. See also Lucas, 907 P.2d at 392 (reasoning that "it is not necessa
rily incompetent for an attorney to concede his or her client's guilt of a particular of
fense" when defense counsel knows the prosecution has ample evidence to prove the
charge).
154. Abshier, 28 P.3d at 595.
155. Id.
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may wish to profess their innocence even at the risk that the jury
may be alienated and return a death sentence. Consider the com
plaint of the capital murder defendant in State v. Stenson: 156
[T]hey [Stenson's attorneys] said that unless I agreed to the way
they wanted to proceed on the trial that they were going to with
draw and what they wanted to-both their views on the death
penalty prohibit them from fighting for me.
.
And I want to state that I am not guilty of these charges that
are against me .... But I was told that because of their views on
my, the potential of me receiving the death penalty, that they
would not fight for me .... [B]asically what they wanted to do is
pussy foot through the trial and concentrate on getting me a life
sentence ... .1 57

Although the trend seems to be to find counsel admissions of
guilt reasonable in the context of capital defense,158 the Supreme
Court of Florida bucked the trend with its decision in Nixon v. Sin
gletary.159 In that case, Nixon appealed his death penalty convic
tion for first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson. 160
During the guilt phase of his trial,161 his attorney admitted Nixon's
guilt during the opening statement 162 and the closing argument.1 63
On appeal, Nixon argued that "these comments were the equivalent
of a guilty plea by his attorney"164 and amounted to ineffective
representation. 165
The court agreed. 166 Although the court recognized that "in
certain unique situations, counsel for the defense may make a tacti
156. 940 P.2d 1239 (Wash. 1997) (applying the Strickland standard to uphold the
defendant's conviction).
157. Id. at 1286 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (quoting R. of Proceedings (July 13,
1994) at 3121-22).
158. See supra notes 151-155.
159. 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000).
160. Id. at 619.
161. Id. at 620.
162. In his opening statement, Nixon's attorney said, "[T]here won't be any ques
tion, none whatsoever, that my client ... caused Jeannie [sic] Bickner's death .... [T]hat
fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond any reasonable doubt." Nixon v. State,
572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1990) (alterations in original).
163. In closing, Nixon's attorney remarked to the jury, "I wish I could stand
before you and argue that what happened wasn't caused by Mr. Nixon, but we all know
better. . . . I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
each and every element of the crimes charged ...." Id.
164. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 620.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 624. See discussion comparing unauthorized admissions of guilt to
guilty pleas infra Part III.B.
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cal decision to admit guilt during the guilt phase in an effort to per
suade the jury to spare the defendant's life during the penalty
phase,"167 the court held that "the dividing line between a sound
defense strategy and ineffective assistance of counsel is whether or
not the client has given his or her consent to such a strategy."168
Remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to establish whether
Nixon consented,169 the court held that the Cronic exception would
control on remand if Nixon could establish that "he did not consent
to counsel's strategy."170
In Nixon, the court grounded its decision in the principle that
only the defendant can make the fundamental decision to admit
guilt.l71 The court was unpersuaded that, in light of Nixon's disrup
tive behavior and the overwhelming evidence against him,l72 coun
sel's strategy could be considered effective assistance. 173 While the
court recognized that Nixon's trial counsel's strategy might have
been Nixon's best chance of avoiding the death penalty,174 it sug
gested that, absent Nixon's consent to admitting guilt, counsel
should have "[held] the State to its burden of proof by clearly artic
ulating to the jury. .. that the State must establish each element of
the crime charged and that a conviction can only be based upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."175 If this more conservative
strategy works to the defendant's detriment, he has no one to blame
but himself.176
C.

Strickland Analysis Appropriately Applied: In re Personal
Restraint of StensonI77
In rare circumstances, the two-prong Strickland analysis re
167.
168.
169.

Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 623.
Id.
Id. at 624. The record did not clearly indicate Nixon's lack of consent: he

was absent from the courtroom for most of his trial, due to his mental illness and dis
ruptive behavior. Id. at 620 n.3, 628-29, (Anstead, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 623.
171. Id. at 624-25. "[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that the defendant,
not the attorney, is the captain of the ship. Although the attorney can make some
tactical decisions, the ultimate choice as to which direction to sail is left up to the defen
dant." Id. at 625 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 625.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975), limited by Martinez

v. Ct. App., 528 U.S. 152 (2000) ("The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will
bear the personal consequences of a conviction."».
177. 16 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2001).
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mains the appropriate standard by which to evaluate an ineffective
assistance claim arising out of counsel's unauthorized concession of
guilt. In re Personal Restraint of Stenson is one such case. There,
the defendant asked the Washington Supreme Court to reverse his
death penalty conviction for the murder of his wife and business
partner. 178 Stenson argued, essentially, that his attorneys consid
ered the guilt phase of his trial not "winnable"179 and instead con
centrated their efforts on the penalty phase,180 while Stenson
wanted his attorneys to do everything possible to prove his inno
cence. 18l Because of this disagreement over the primary objective
of the trial, Stenson argued that his attorneys' perfunctory han
dling 182 of the guilt phase amounted to a concession of the guilt
issue. 183
Although one justice dissented,184 believing that Stenson's at
torneys effectively conceded his guilt,18S the majority of the court
applied the two-prong Strickland analysis and upheld the convic
tion. 186 In evaluating the reasonableness prong of Strickland, the
court held that "there is no evidence to suggest that the representa
tion Stenson received was in any way inadequate."187 Both attor
neys were experienced 188 and communicated regularly with
Stenson. 189 In preparing for the guilt phase, the defense's investiga
178. /d. at 5.
179. /d. at 6.
180. Id. at 8. Stenson complained that the lead attorney assigned to his case
"spent virtually no time preparing for the jury trial but concentrated instead on mo
tions, jury selection, and the penalty phase." Id. at 11.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Stenson principally objected to counsels' refusa1.to introduce "other suspect"
evidence that would have suggested that Denise Hoerner, the widow of one of the vic
tims, actually committed the murders. Id. at 11. His attorneys rejected this tactic be
cause it was unsupported by the physical evidence, and they feared it would turn the
jury against Stenson and make a death penalty verdict more likely. Id. Stenson also
objected to counsels' decision not to call defense witnesses, id. at 18, and to counsels'
allegedly inadequate preparation for cross-examination of crucial prosecution wit
nesses, id. at 23-25.
183. See id. at 26 n.4 & 29 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 26. Justice Sanders would have reversed the conviction and presumed
prejudice based upon the "irreconcilable conflicts" exception to the Strickland stan
dard. Id. at 26-29. See supra note 52.
185. Stenson, 16 P.3d at 26.
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id. at 10. Lead counsel, Attorney Fred Leatherman, had "extensive experi
ence" in death penalty defense, and co-counsel, David Neupert, though not "death
penalty qualified," had been co-counsel on several homicide cases. Id.
189. Id. at 11. Leatherman met with Stenson ten times between October 1993
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tor billed the court approximately $35,000 for his services. 190 At
trial, defense counsel cross-examined twenty-five of the State's
thirty-three witnesses l91 and called five defense witnesses. l92 Per
haps most importantly, defense counsel made no statement ex
pressly conceding guilt or reasonable doubt until the penalty phase
of the trial.1 93 These facts undermined Stenson's claim that the de
fense mounted by his attorneys was in any way perfunctory; indeed,
the quality of representation Stenson received seems far superior to
that given many death penalty defendants represented by ap
pointed counsel.1 94
In cases like Stenson, where the defense counsel's admission is
not express or even clearly implied, and the trial record reveals that
defense counsel rigorously held the prosecution to the burden of
proof, the Strickland analysis is appropriate. In such a case, the
Sixth Amendment requirement that the prosecution "survive the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing"195 has been satisfied,
and the Cronic exception does not apply ..
III.

JUSTIFYING A CLEAR RULE AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED
ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL

Courts that resist a broader application of the Cronic excep
tion fear that such application will require an in-depth inquiry into
the facts of individual cases,l96 thereby undermining what they con
sider the purpose of the. exception-to identify a narrow class of
cases in which prejudice may be presumed "without inquiry into
and January 1994, and Neupert met with Stenson "roughly twice a week" between No
vember 1993 and June 1994. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 22. In the penalty phase, counsel told the jury, "[W]e accept your
verdict without reservation whatsoever." Id. Stenson argued that this statement vio
lated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the court held that
that privilege does not extend to the penalty phase. Id:
194. See discussion infra Part IILC; see generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for
the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent De
fense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995); Margaret H.
Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808 (2000); Erika E. Pedersen, Note, You Only Get What You Can Pay
For: Dziubak v. Mott and Its Warning to the Indigent Defendant, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
999 (1995).
195. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
196. See discussion supra Part LC, especially notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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counsel's actual performance at trial"197-and encouraging in
creased litigation because trial records on Sixth Amendment ap
peals would need to be examined in greater detail.
To some degree, this fear may be warranted. There are many
contexts in which defense counsel may admit a client's guilt, and
each case has its own unique facts and circumstances. Broad appli
cation of the Cronic exception may lead some appellate courts to
get bogged down in the minutiae of these cases and lose sight of the
dispositive issue: the reliability of the original conviction. 198 How
ever, applying the Strickland analysis to these cases may actually
lead to even more litigation; often the trial record must be scruti
nized to determine, first, whether defense counsel's admission was
objectively reasonable, and second, whether the defendant suffered
prejudice. A clear rule establishing that it is never reasonable for
defense counsel to concede guilt or the absence of reasonable doubt
to any charged offense without the defendant's consent would re
solve the vast majority of cases like Swanson and the others ex
amined in this Note. A simple review of the trial record would
suffice to demonstrate whether or not a prohibited concession had
been made.
More difficult cases where the attorney's concession is not ex
press or even clearly implied 199 may not be resolved by such a rule.
In such cases, the Strickland two-prong analysis will remain appro
priate because a perfunctory defense that nevertheless holds the
government to the burden of proof does not constitute a break
down in the adversary system.
The necessity of such a rule is bolstered by already existing
notions of the attorney-client relationship in the criminal context,
constitutional protections surrounding the entrance of guilty pleas,
and public policy reasons. The next section addresses each of these
justifications in tum.
A.

The Attorney-Client Relationship: Rights and Responsibilities
of Counsel and Accused

Our justice system is grounded in the perception that the rela
tionship between counsel and accused is a somewhat collaborative
one, in which certain fundamental decisions are reserved for the
197. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662.
198. See, e.g., Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1994).
199. See, e.g., In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2001).
See discussion supra Part II.C.
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accused,zoo while other decisions are the province of defense coun
sel.201 This understanding of the attorney-client relationship lays
the groundwork for a clear rule precluding unauthorized admissions
of guilt by counsel. Such a rule would reflect the principle that ef
fective representation must comport with the basic responsibilities
of defense counsel without encroaching upon the fundamental
rights of the defendant.
Defense counsel's overarching function is to ensure that the
defendant receives a fair trial. 202 This function involves certain ba
sic duties. Counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty and must avoid
conflicts of interest. 203 Counsel must serve as an advocate for the
defendant, rather than a friend of the court.204 Arising out of the
role of advocate are more particular duties, such as the duty to
"consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution."205 Counsel must also provide the skill and knowledge
necessary to ensure reliable adversarial testing of the prosecution's
case at trial.2°6
Beyond this, there are guidelines establishing which tactical de
200. See infra notes 209-213.
201. See infra notes 207-208.
202. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). "[T]his Court has
recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial." Id. at 684.
203. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,346 (1980). Although tactical disputes
between the attorney and client are not traditionally characterized as conflicts of inter
est, the Cuyler test is beginning to be raised in this context. In Osborn v. Shillinger, the
Tenth Circuit stated:
A defense attorney who abandons his duty of loyalty to his client and effec
tively joins the state in an effort to attain a conviction or death sentence suf
fers from an obvious conflict of interest. . . . In fact, an attorney who is
burdened by a conflict between his client's interests and his own sympathies to
the prosecution's position is considerably worse than an attorney with loyalty
to other defendants, because the interests of the state and the defendant are
necessarily in opposition.
861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). See also In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d
1, 8-9 (majority opinion), & 29 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
Those who would apply conflict of interest analysis to tactical admissions of guilt
by counsel argue that "ultimately there are some decisions reserved to the client, even
when his lawyer honestly ... believes the client fails to promote his self-interest in the
best possible fashion." Stenson, 16 P.3d at 29 n.7.
204. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Ferri v. Ackerman,
444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (stating that "[i]ndeed, an indispensable element of the effec
tive performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the govern
ment and to oppose it in adversary litigation").
205. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
206. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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clSlons are within the attorney's sole discretion. The ABA Stan
dards for Criminal Justice provides such guidelines:
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ulti
mately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be
made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: .
(i) what plea to enter;
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; and
(iii) whether to testify in his or her own behalf.
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to
conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike,
what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and
tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer af
ter consultation with the client. 207

These guidelines create the inference that so long as the attorney
does not infringe upon the enumerated rights of the defendant, all
reasonable tactical decisions are permissible. But the ABA guide
lines also suggest that the lawyer must reach these decisions "after
consultation with the client. "208
As provided by the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice, a
number of fundamental decisions are reserved for the defendant. 209
The decision of how to plead, for example, must be made solely by
the defendant, based on his intelligent and voluntary choice. 210 To
insure that the plea is voluntary and intelligent, the trial court must
make an on-the-record inquiry of the defendant. 211 The defendant
also has ultimate authority as to whether to waive a jury trial, testify
on his or her own behalf, or to take an appeal.2 12 .
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly so held,
many lower federal courts and state courts interpret the Sixth
207. 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5) (2d ed. Supp. 1986) (em
phasis added).
208. !d.
209. Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.2(a) (2001) ("In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify. ").
210. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). In Boykin, the Supreme Court
held that because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of several constitutional rights
specifically the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment rights to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers-that cannot be pre
sumed from a silent record, courts must conduct an on-the-record inquiry of the ac
cused "to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence." !d. at 243-44.
211. !d.
212. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
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Amendment as granting the defendant a right to decide, within the
range of permissible defenses, the type of defense he wishes to
mount. 213 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide
that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued. "214 Without afford
ing the defendant total control over his defense, the Supreme Court
in Strickland observed that "[c]ounsel's actions are usually based,
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defen
dant and on information supplied by the defendant."215
These professional guidelines and case law suggest that the at
torney-client relationship ought to be a collaborative one, in which
there is no firm rule that matters of strategy are left solely to the
attorney's discretion, and decisions integral to the objectives of rep
resentation should be made by the defendant after receiving the
advice of counsel. A clear rule that counsel may not make unau
thorized concessions of guilt would comport with these traditional
conceptions of the attorney-client relationship and would not in
fringe upon counsel's autonomy in making strategic decisions be
yond those limits already recommended by current standards of
criminal representation.
B.

Counsel's Admission Is Tantamount to a Guilty Plea

In Nixon v. Singletary,216 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that defense counsel's admissions of his client's guilt during his
opening statement217 and closing argument 218 "were the functional
equivalent of a guilty plea."219 A concession of guilt by counsel
213. See, e.g., Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 625 (Fla. 2000) (making ex
tended metaphor of trial as ship voyage, with defendant as captain, with "ultimate
choice as to which direction to sail"); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1147 (Kan. 2000)
("The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the
accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the
accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,'
who must be 'confronted with witnesses against him,' and who must be accorded 'com
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.'" (quoting Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 819 (1975»; State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 308-09 (Wash. 1993) (finding that it
was not unreasonable trial strategy for an attorney to accede to defendant's wishes as to
how to conduct the defense at trial, even though the tactic ultimately proved
unsuccessful).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.2(a) (2000).
215. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
216. 758 So. 2d 618, 634 (Fla. 2000). See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
217. See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1990).
218. Id.
219. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 624. See also State v. Gordon, 641 N.W.2d 183 (Wis. Ct.
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deprives the defendant of his "constitutional right to have his guilt
or innocence decided by the jury,"220 a right reserved by the defen
dant when he enters a plea of "not guilty" and makes the decision
to proceed to trial.221 In pleading "not guilty," a defendant makes
it clear "that he intends to hold the government to strict proof be
yond a reasonable doubt as to the offense charged,"222 and a con
cession of guilt by counsel, no matter how well-reasoned the
strategy behind it, alleviates the government of this burden.
Because counsel's admission of guilt is the functional
equivalent of a guilty plea by the defendant, a rule prohibiting such
an admission should provide a procedure for documenting the de
fendant's consent. Failure to define such a procedure will likely re
sult in case-by-case litigation necessary to determine whether and
how a defendant manifested his consent. The Nixon court required
that, when a trial court knows or suspects defense counsel's strategy
requires conceding guilt or the absence of reasonable doubt, the
judge should make an on-the-record examination of the defendant
to ensure that the defendant has given his independent, informed
consent to counsel's strategy.223 This examination is the same as
that required of defendants entering a guilty plea,224 and it should
App. 2002). In Gordon, the court held that "a defense attorney need not say the magic
words 'my client has decided to plead guilty,' before a court may conclude that defense
counsel unconstitutionally waived a defendant's right to plead not guilty." Id. at 195
(citing Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1991». But see United States v.
Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 83-84 (1st Cir. 1999) (evaluating counsel's concession of gUilt
under the Strickland prejudice standard). In Gomes, the First Circuit commented that
"[c]ounsel's concession was not a guilty plea, which involves conviction without proof,
and is therefore properly hedged with protections. Here, the government had to pro
vide a jury with admissible evidence of guilt and did so in abundance." Id. at 84.
There is also an argument that, in jurisdictions where the jury determines the sen
tence as well as the issue of guilt, an attorney's admission of guilt cannot be equated
with a gUilty plea because, despite the attorney's concession, the defendant retains the
right to be sentenced by the jury. See Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579, 597 n.7 (Okla.
Crirn. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1548 (2002).
220. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 623 (quoting Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th
Cir. 1981».
221. Wiley, 647 F.2d at 650 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969».
222. Id. (citing Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1965».
223. Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 625. See also Wiley, 647 F.2d at 650 (holding that "[i]n
those rare cases where counsel advises his client that the latter's guilt should be admit
ted, the client's knowing consent to such trial strategy must appear outside the presence
of the jury on the trial record in the manner consistent with Boykin") (referring to
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), see discussion supra note 210); State v. House,
456 S.E.2d 292, 297 (N.C. 1995) (urging "both the bar and the trial bench to be diligent
in making a full record of a defendant's consent when a Harbison issue arises at trial")
(referring to State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1985».
224. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44.

2002]

THE CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING

345

be utilized to establish a defendant's consent to counsel's admission
because the consequences of such an admission are indistinguish
able from the consequences of entering a guilty plea.
Some courts have held that a plea-like waiver recording the
defendant's intelligent and voluntary consent is not necessary when
defense counsel admits the client's guilt. These courts believe that
the defendant's silence at trial while counsel makes the admission
demonstrates acquiescence. 225 Unfortunately, this silent waiver ap
proach fails to recognize that the defendant might feel too intimi
dated to speak out of turn and object, or may not understand the
import and effect of counsel's statements until the window of op
portunity to object has passed. 226
Moreover, in Cronic, the Supreme Court suggested that the
measure of effective assistance is independent of the defendant's
subjective opinion of his counsel's performance, commenting:
If counsel is a reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitu

tional standards irrespective of his client's evaluation of his per
formance. It is for this reason that we attach no weight to either
respondent's expression of satisfaction with counsel's perform
ance at the time of his trial, or to his later expression of
dissatisfaction. 227
225. See Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579, 598 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (finding that
"[a]ppellant acquiesced in the trial strategy of his counsel where he made no effort at
any time during the trial to express to the judge his disagreement with the strategy"),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1548 (2002); People v. Cain, 892 P.2d 1224, 1241 (Cal. 1995)
(commenting that "[i]t is not the trial court's duty to inquire whether the defendant
agrees with his counsel's decision to make a concession, at least where, as here, there is
no explicit indication the defendant disagrees with his attorney's tactical approach ");
State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Minn. 1992) (noting that "[f]rom his opening state
ment through his closing argument, defense counsel consistently took the position that
defendant had caused the victim's death. At no time does the record disclose that de
fendant had any objection to or dissatisfaction with this trial strategy").
The issue of whether an on-the-record waiver is advisable or necessary when coun
sel pursues a strategy admitting guilt remains an open question in the First Circuit. See
United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 1999) (failing to reach the question of
"whether and when a defendant's consent ... to a course of action might be relevant to
an ineffective assistance claim," because such an argument could not be supported by
the record of the case at bar).
226. There is a similar debate regarding whether waiver of a defendant's right to
testify may be demonstrated by a silent record. Compare United States v. McMeans,
927 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curium) (requiring defendant to protest his law
yer's action denying the right to testify to the judge during trial), and United States v.
Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 928 F.2d 1470
(9th. Cir 1991), with People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514-15 (Colo. 1984) (requiring the
judge to inquire of the defendant directly whether he wants to testify), and State v.
Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 81-82 (W.Va. 1988).
227. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (1984) (citation omitted).
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If the defendant's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with counsel's

performance is not germane to the question of whether the consti
tutional standards of effective assistance have been met, it serves no
purpose to require that the defendant express his dissatisfaction at
trial in order to preserve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
for appeal. A clear rule requiring trial courts to conduct a colloquy
to record the defendant's consent to a strategy that concedes guilt is
necessary to eliminate time consuming and counterproductive liti
gation over whether or not the defendant's silence at trial consti
tuted a waiver.
C.

The Nexus Between Indigent Defense and Ineffective
Assistance

When reviewing cases involving an unauthorized admission of
guilt by counsel, a disturbing pattern emerges. Most of these cases
involve court-appointed representation,228 and, by implication, indi
gent defendants whose socio-economic disadvantage makes them
dependent upon appointed counsel to assist with their defense.
The nexus between indigent defense and (in)adequacy of rep
resentation is well documented and much lamented. 229 Public de
fense programs are notoriously overburdened and under-funded,230
which degrades the quality of representation. 231 Due to inadequate
compensation and excessive caseloads, public defenders often lack
228. Frequently, appellate decisions addressing attorney admissions of guilt ex
pressly note that trial counsel was court-appointed. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1,
5 (1965); Haynes v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 759 (5th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane, 298 F.3d 375
(5th Cir. 2002); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 614
(10th Cir. 1988); Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1981); State v. Carter, 14
P.3d 1138, 1141 (Kan. 2000); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 506 (N.C. 1985); State v.
Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1143 (N.H. 1991); State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1270 (Wash.
1997), affd, In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2001). Although
many decisions make no mention of whether defense counsel was appointed, my re
search only uncovered one case where the court specifically noted that defense counsel
was privately retained, State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 859 (Minn. 1984).
229. See generally David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New
Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469
(1992); Erika E. Pedersen, You Only Get What You Can Pay For: Dziubak v. Mott and
Its Warning to the Indigent Defendant, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 999 (1995); Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995).
230. Pedersen, supra note 229, at 1003-07.
231. Id. As one court has observed, "The relationship between an attorney's
compensation and the quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored." White v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989).

2002]

THE CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING

347

the time and resources to interview all witnesses, investigate facts
thoroughly, and file all appropriate pretrial motions. 232 Without
the ability to perform such vital and basic investigative and prepara
tory tasks, public defenders have no choice but to rely on the gov
ernment to produce all of the relevant facts of the case?33
.The impact of the indigent defense crisis on the issue of unau
thorized admissions of guilt by counsel is readily apparent. Without
adequate resources to investigate and prepare alternate theories of
defense, appointed counsel may see no alternative but to accept the
prosecution's evidence of guilt and concede reasonable doubt at
trial.
Likewise, overworked public defenders often do not have the
time for lengthy consultations with clients to establish an under
standing of the client's defense objectives. At best, these attorneys
may not even realize that their client does not understand or ap
prove of the strategy to concede guilt at trial. At worst, they may
not care: defense counsel may take a patronizing view of their indi
gent and often uneducated clients and may believe that the better
course is to follow their own more experienced judgment about
how to proceed with the case. Defense counsel's decision to pursue
a strategy requiring a concession of guilt may be exacerbated when
the client is a member of a minority group234 or, though competent
to stand trial, has only marginal mental competency.235
232. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled
to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 369 (1993).
233. The facts of United States v. Cronic illustrate this problem: there, the court
appointed attorney had less than one month to prepare a defense against charges aris
ing out of a complicated "check-kiting scheme," while the government took more than
four years to investigate the crime. 466 U.S. 648, 649-50. The Supreme Court stated
that this discrepancy did not violate the constitutional requirement of effective assis
tance of counsel, since "[a] competent attorney would have no reason to question the
authenticity, accuracy, or relevance of [the government's] evidence." Id. at 664. How
ever, the nature of the adversarial justice system requires competent defense attorneys
to do just that.
234. See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (defense
counsel referred to defendant as a "little old nigger boy" at the close of state's presenta
tion of documentary evidence during sentencing phase of trial); Ex Parte Guzmon, 730
S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (defense counsel referred to El Salvadoran
client as "wet back" in front of jury). While these decisions do not involve admissions
of gUilt by counsel, they exemplify racially-motivated contempt for and condescension
toward clients.
235. Several cases concerning an unauthorized concession of guilt by counsel in
volve defendants of dubious mental competency. See Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698,
701-02 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that defense counsel's failure to present evidence of
defendant's hospitalizations for suicidal behavior and hallucinations was not prejudi
cial); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 627-29 (Fla. 2000) (Anstead, J., concurring)
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CONCLUSION

Prejudice analysis under Strickland will almost always be fatal
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by defendants whose
attorneys admit their guilt. After all, if these defendants could not
convince their own attorneys to argue their innocence at trial, there
is virtually no likelihood that an appellate court will find a reasona
ble probability that, but for counsel's admission, the defendant
would not have been convicted. 236 But whether or not the defen
dant should have been convicted is not the right standard by which
to judge ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from de
fense counsel's unauthorized concession of guilt.
Like Joe Elton Nixon 237 and Steven Abshier,238 many of the
defendants whose attorneys pursue a guilt-conceding tactic have
committed terrible crimes, and ought to be convicted-but the de
fendant's guilt or innocence is really beside the point. The atrocity
of their crimes, their inability to hire their own attorneys, their race,
their mental illnesses-these factors do not justify suspending de
fendants' constitutional rights to a fair trial, presumption of inno
cence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and especially, to effective
representation. Society needs people like Nixon and Abshier to be
convicted, but they should be convicted because the government's
case has "survive[d] the crucible of meaningful adversarial test
ing,"239 not because their attorneys made the decision, for whatever
reason, to abandon their role as the defendant's advocate in our
adversarial criminal justice system by conceding the defendant's
guilt to the jury.
Heidi H. Woessner

(arguing that defense counsel's failure to request a competency hearing in light of de
fendant's bizarre and disruptive behavior provided an alternate basis for reversing de
fendant's murder conviction), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 980 (2000); State v. Provost, 490
N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. 1992) (involving a schizophrenic defendant).
236. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
237. See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000). Nixon was convicted of
kidnapping, murder, and arson after accosting a woman, stealing her jewelry and her
car, tying her to a tree, and setting her on fire. Id. at 629-30 (Wells, J., dissenting).
238. See Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 1548 (2002). Abshier was convicted of child abuse murder in the death of his
twenty-two month old daughter, Ashley.
239. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).

